Audits, exploits, threat models, and defensive engineering across the stack.
A 15× spike on a $17M pool shifts its 30-minute v2 TWAP by 9.3% in one block. The arithmetic-mean accumulator is far weaker than v3's geometric tick accumulator. Covers the manipulation cost formula, the Inverse Finance case study, and minimum safe pool depth.
Probabilistic classifiers miss 30–40 % of policy violations. Lean 4 theorem provers and SMT solvers make certain guardrail tiers mathematically certain — here's how the four-layer policy stack works.
Every ECDSA signature broadcasts the wallet's public key. A March 2026 Google/EF paper tightens the quantum break estimate to ~500k physical qubits — here's what that means for autonomous AI agent wallets.
Cross-chain bridges have lost $2.5B to hacks because receiving contracts accept messages they cannot cryptographically verify. AI agents operating across chains inherit this exact problem. Here are the four trust models, their real security parameters, and a principled agent policy.
A scan of ~2,000 MCP servers found zero with authentication. When an AI agent calls a tool, the tool has no idea who authorized it, with what scope, or whether a human was ever involved. IBCT tokens and the HDP IETF draft add an unforgeable answer — in 0.049 ms Rust verification.
An AI inference that runs inside a TEE proves it with an attestation quote. A smart contract can check that quote — for ~4-5M gas naively, down to a flat ~290k once a zkVM compresses it. But every gas unit buys a chip vendor's signature, and in 2025 a $1,000 interposer forged one.
Bond-and-slash verifiable AI assumes someone audits. But checking costs money and pays nothing, so a rational verifier won't — the verifier's dilemma. Proof of Sampling fixes it with a bounty, and the math says honest inference holds at a 0.74% sampling rate where nobody ever arbitrates.
An on-chain agent reports its work in prose — and some of those sentences are fabricated tool calls. zkML proves the wrong thing at minutes per query. The blockchain already wrote an unforgeable receipt for the actions that matter, and a 12ms signed receipt covers the rest.
An MCP tool's description is trusted context the user never sees. Hide an instruction there and a wallet-signing agent will route your USDC to an attacker. MCPTox: the best-aligned model still refused under 3% of these attacks — so the defense can't live in the model.
An LLM agent that writes its own working smart-contract exploit isn't hypothetical: A1 hits 63% on real exploited contracts and once pulled $8.59M from a single bug. The economics are the story — at a few dollars a scan, attackers profit at a tenth the contract value defenders need.
A decentralized GPU network has to answer two questions an AWS invoice never raises: is this the GPU it claims, and did it actually do the work? io.net logged 327,000 registered GPUs and roughly 6,720 daily-verified. We dissect metadata trust, PoW puzzles, performance fingerprinting, and zkGPU-ID.
You can copy open model weights bit-for-bit, so on-chain ownership can't be cryptographically enforced — only proven. Sentient's answer: fine-tune 24,576 secret key-response fingerprints into the weights and make scale the security parameter.